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ABSTRACT

This Article seeks to assess how the U.N. system has
enforced regimes of non-recognition under internationallaw.
Claims by certain communities to constitute states and
claims by some states to hold title to certain pieces of
territory have met with oppositionfrom various quarters. At
times, the United Nations has attempted to organize
internationalnon-recognition of such claims. The claim by
the state of Indonesia to hold title to East Timor presents a
vivid and important example of an attempt to set up a regime
of non-recognition by the United Nations.
The Article
examines how the United Nations addressed the Indonesian
claim and inquires whether this amounted to a self-enforcing
regime of non-recognition.
The Article examines in detail U.N. practice in other
regions of the world, includingKatanga, Rhodesia, the South
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African "Homelands,"Namibia, Israel, Cyprus, and Kuwait,
in which the United Nations legislated rules of nonrecognition. In light of these examples, the Article concludes
with a discussion of the East Timor case, in which the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that U.N.
resolutions had not in fact created an internationalrule of
recognition or non-recognition regarding the status of East
Timor. Nonetheless, the Article speculates that the ICJ may
have left open the possibility of adjudication of claims of
illegal recognition, thus creating a future mechanism of
regulating controversial claims concerning territory and
statehood.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The inhabitants of East Timor on August 30, 1999 took part
in a referendum on the future status of their country.1 From this
2
point, East Timor was on a course toward independence.
Political decisions in Portugal-the former colonial power and the

1.
See People of East Timor Reject Proposed Special Autonomy, Express
Wish to Begin Transition to Independence, Secretary-General Informs Security
Council, U.N. Press Release No. SG/SM/7119, SC/6722, Sept. 3, 1999, at 1.
See Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation in East Timor, U.N.
2.
Doc. S/ 1999/1024 (1999) (presenting "a framework and concept of operations for
the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor" (UNAMET} pending
final establishment of an independent East Timor). This report was submitted
pursuant to S.C. Res. 1264, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264
(1999).
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state designated in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV)
of December 15, 1960 as "Administering Power" 3-political
decisions in the territory itself, and, perhaps most of all, political
decisions in Indonesia-the country that had actually controlled
East Timor since 1975-were central determinants of that
course. 4 At the same time, the legal status of East Timor should
not be ignored as a factor in the movement of the territory from
de facto province of Indonesia to independent state in statu
nascindL In particular, East Timor's status as a non-selfgoverning territory (NSGT) under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter
allowed self-determination to act within East Timor with a certain
practical effect not guaranteed as of right in all parts of the
world.s

3.

The status was recognized in subsequent resolutions.

See infra note

94.
4.
A milestone in the political process was the conclusion on May 5, 1999
of a set of agreements in New York between Indonesia and Portugal. See Question
of East Thmor: Report of the Secretary-Generalto the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
A/53/951-S/1999/513 (1999). These agreements had the purpose of resolving
the East Timor issue and (1) proposed a "Constitutional Framework for a Special
Autonomy for East Timor" providing for a "Special Autonomous Region of East
Timor" (SARET) within the Republic of Indonesia, id. at 9, and (2) provided for a
'popular consultation" to determine whether to accept the Constitutional
Framework providing for the SARET, id. at 5. It was understood that rejection of
the Constitutional Framework would entail independent statehood for East Timor.
The political environment that made the process possible took form after the fall of
the government of General Suharto in 1998.
5.
On the special legal character of non-self-governing territories, see
James R. Crawford, State Practice and InternationalLaw in Relation to Secession,
69 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 87-92 (1998) (based on James R. Crawford, State Practice
and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession, factum before the
Supreme Court of Canada, Feb. 19,
1997 (visited Feb. 13, 2000)
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca>); Hurst Hannum, Rethinldng Self-Determination, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-14 (1993) (noting that U.N. Charter article 73(e) and G.A. Res.
1541 identify inhabitants of NSGTs as "at least one of the categories of peoples
entitled to self-determination"). See also Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor
Dispute: Self-Determination at the InternationalCourt of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INTL
& COMP. L. REV. 323, 335-36 (1994); Thomas D. Grant, Extending Decolonization:
How the United Nations Might Have Addressed Kosovo, GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
(forthcoming 2000).
Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, in Articles 73 and 74, states
Article 73
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for
the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-goverment recognize the principle that the interests of the
inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of
international peace and security established by the present Charter, the
well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples
concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational
advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against
abuses;
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Yet Indonesia, the state most proximate to East Timor and
the state that ruled East Timor for nearly a quarter century, long
had claimed that no process of self-determination was required in
the territory, apart from that already coordinated by the
Indonesian government and its forces of occupation.
Selfdetermination of the East Timorese, Indonesia claimed, was
6
achieved through incorporation of their territory into Indonesia.
Indonesia persisted in this claim, even though the advent of
Indonesian rule in East Timor was condemned as an illegal use of

b.

c.
d.

e.

to develop self-government, to take due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive
development of their free political institutions, according to the
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and
their varying stages of advancement;
to further international peace and security;
to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage
research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where
appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to
the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific
purposes set forth in this Article; and
to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information
purposes, subject to such limitation as security and
constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other
information of a technical nature relating to economic, social,
and educational conditions in the territories for which they are
respectively responsible other than those territories to which
Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74
Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the
territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their
metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of goodneighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of
the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-74. These obligations were amplified by Declarationon the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N.
GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961), which stated
Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those
territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance
with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction
as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy
complete independence and freedom.
6.
For more detailed developments of the Indonesian position from
Indonesia's Foreign Minister, see Ali Alatas, East Timor: De-Bunking the Myths
Around a Process of Decolonization, INDON. NEws, March 20, 1992, at 1, 4, cited in
Simpson, supra note 5, at 339 n.74; The Attempt to Rewrite the History of East
Timor
Continues
(visited
Dec.
4,
1999)
<http://www3.itu.ch/
MISSIONS/Indonesia/Attempt.htm> (quoting Situation in East Timor: Report of the
Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/56 (1996)).
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force 7 and the continuation of that rule was criticized as a
violation of the rights of the inhabitants of the territory.8
It was left to the international community to preserve the
status of East Timor as an NSGT. In particular, this meant
assuring that measures were avoided that might have lent legal
support to the Indonesian claim. Critical in the preservation of
the status of East Timor as NSGT was a collective decision, taken
at the U.N. level, to deny de jure status to the occupation,
annexation, and administration by Indonesia of East Timor. The
U.N. General Assembly and Security Counsel strongly implied
early in the crisis over East Timor that the claims of Indonesia
were predicated on breaches of international law. 9 This view
appeared to develop into a decision to establish a regime of nonrecognition against Indonesia's claims. The General Assembly, in
Resolution 31/53 of December 1, 1976, "[rejected] the claim that
East Timor has been integrated into Indonesia, inasmuch as the
people of the Territory have not been able to exercise freely their
right to self-determination and independence." The Assembly
repeated this formulation in 1989.10 U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 33/39 of December 13, 1978 "reaffirm[ed] the
inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination
and independence, and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve
that right."1 1 The Security Council, in Resolution 389 of April 22,
1976, "call[ed] upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of
East Timor, as well as the inalienable right of its people to selfdetermination." 12 Thus, a regime of non-recognition was adopted
by the most broadly constituted organization in international
society, and, with varying levels of resolve, this regime was

7.
See G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, paras. 4-5,
U.N Doc. A/10034 (1976) ("strongly deplorfing] the military intervention of the
armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor' and "[c]all[ing] upon the
Government of Indonesia to desist from further violations of the territorial integrity
of Portuguese Timor and to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the
Territory in order to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercise their right
to self-determination and independence"); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess.,
1869th mtg. (1976) (using language similar to that in G.A. Res. 3485, supra).
8.
See Situation of Human Rights in East imor, U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, Res. 1997/63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/63 (1997). See also
G.A. Res. 35/27, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 48, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1981) (expressing "deepest concern at the continued suffering of the people of
East Timor as a result of the situation still prevailing in the Territory"); G.A. Res.
37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 51, at 228, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983)
(expressing concern "at the humanitarian situation prevailing in the Territory").
9.
See Simpson, supra note 5, at 339-40.
10.
G.A. Res. 32/34, U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess., Supp. No. 45, para. 3, U.N.
Doc.A/32/45 (1978).
11.
G.A. Res. 33/39, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/33/45 91979).
12.
S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1914th mtg. para. 1 (1997).
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maintained throughout the period during which Indonesia ruled
3
East Timor. 1
The object of this Article is to assess how-and indeed
whether-the U.N. system has enforced regimes of nonrecognition.' 4 This is a matter of broad interest. There are some
200 communities in the world today that claim to constitute
independent states.' s For the most part, the claims of such
communities meet little or no opposition from states or from
international organizations. A very small but important minority
of putative states, however, face persistent opposition to their
claims to statehood from some segment of international society.' 6
Western Sahara, Anjouan, Chechnya, Kurdistan, and the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) each represent a claim,
largely unrecognized in the world at large, of a community
forming a state. The non-recognition of such claims has been set
forth at different levels and by different participants in the

13.
As discussed below, U.N. organs have constituted rules of nonrecognition with varying degrees of precision. John Dugard, whose treatment of
U.N. non-recognition regimes was the best and most comprehensive at the time of
its publication in 1987, found a rule of non-recognition in connection with the
secessionist province of Katanga, though the language used there was far from
explicit in its requirement of non-recognition. See JOHN DUARD, RECOGNITION AND
THE UNITED NATIONS 86 (1987) (analyzing ICJ holdings and writings of publicists).
The language in connection with the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia is
more explicit than that in connection with Katanga and, thus, may be said, a
fortiori, to have set forth a rule of non-recognition. This, however, has been one
matter of controversy at the heart of the contest over East Timor.
14.
Writings on the holding in Case ConcerningEast Timor (Port. v. Austl.),
1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30), did not address in detail its implications for recognition
as a general field of international legal activity. See, e.g., Peter H.F. Bekker, East
Timor, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 94, 96 (1996) (noting that the ICJ held that the U.N.
resolutions on East Timor alone did not establish a rule of non-recognition).
15.
The United Nations, as of the accession of Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga
at the start of the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly, counted 188
member states. In addition to these, there are a handful of entities generally
recognized as states but not members of the United Nations, in particular the
Vatican, Switzerland, and Tuvalu. East Timor and Palestine, as of November
1999, might well have been states in statu nascindi. Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga
were admitted to the United Nations under G.A. Res. 9541 of September 14, 1999.
See G.A. Res. 9541 (54/1, 54/2 & 54/3), 54th Sess., Agenda Item 19, U.N. Doc.
A/54/PV.1 (1999).
16.
By "putative states" I refer to communities that have put forth claims to
statehood of varying robustness, all of which in recent times have established at
least a measure of effective control over at least a part of the territory they claim
as the state territory. This is to distinguish putative states from aspirations to
statehood as yet unrealized in any de facto sense. The many ethnic, religious, or
cultural minorities that have sought statehood are amply documented. See, e.g.,
PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (Catherine Br6imann et al. eds.,
1993); JAMES MINAHAN, NATIONS WITHOUT STATES: A HISTORIcAL DIcTIONARY OF
CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL MOVEMENTS (1996). However, not all of them would fall
within my definition of putative state. For present purposes, for example, I do not
count as putative states the political formations resulting from the aspirations of
the Catalans or the Quebec French.
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decisionmaking process. In some cases, such as Western Sahara,
only a small segment of the international community-perhaps
only one state-participates in non-recognition of the claim to
statehood. 17 In other cases, such as the TRNC, non-recognition
is much more broadly supported.1 8 The case of collective nonrecognition of East Timor, then, is more than a matter of isolated
interest. Its contemporary relevance arguably is magnified by the
rapid pace of events in that territory; more importantly, it usefully
informs an important category of international legal conduct. It
must be anticipated that when claims to a status are contested,
actors taking one side in the contest will express their position as
recognition of the claim while actors on the opposite side will
express their position as non-recognition.
Many contests in
international law-whether over claims to statehood, claims to

17.
Western Sahara was a colony of Spain until 1975, when Spain quit the
territory. The colonial history is presented in Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct.
16). Upon Spain's departure, Morocco and Mauritania, the states neighboring
Western Sahara to the north and south, occupied the territory against the advice
of the U.N. Security Council. See S.C. Res. 380, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1854th
mtg. paras. 2-3 (1976). The inhabitants of Western Sahara formed a governmentin-exile and organized themselves as a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
As many as seventy-five states came to recognize the SADR as the state with title
to the territory of the former Spanish colony. See Foreign Policy Brief on Morocco
and Western Sahara, AFR. NEWS SERV., Feb. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL
12921026.
Morocco, however, occupied it in its entirety after Mauritania
withdrew from the territory, claiming Western Sahara to be part of Morocco and
declining to recognize the SADR. Though after a time some other states joined in
this non-recognition, the regime of non-recognition was impelled essentially as a
concomitant of Moroccan state policy and by unilateral diplomatic exercise. See
Sahara Weekly News Update: Western Sahara Referendum Support Association,
AFR. NEWS SERV., Sept. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14061047 (noting Liberian
retraction of SADR recognition); Togo Withdraws Recognition of Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republi, AFR. NEWS SERVICE, June 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL
11876812; Sahara Weekly News Update: Western Sahara Referendum Support
Association, AFR. NEWS SERV., May 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10553379
(noting Chad's retraction of its recognition of SADR); BakerAwaited in Morocco on
Western Sahara Peace Mission, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 22, 1997, available in
1997 WL 2100901 (noting withdrawal of SADR recognition by Benin, Burkina
Faso, Congo, Peru, and Sao Tomd e Principe).
18.
The United Nations there, like in East Timor, established a rule of nonrecognition. The establishment of the rule at the level of the U.N. stands in
contrast to the non-recognition of the SADR, a non-recognition essentially
authored by one state. See Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections),
310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19-20 (Mar. 23, 1995) (noting consensus of illegality
of TRNC); S.C. Res. 541, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2500th mtg. para. 7 (1984)
("[ciall[ing] upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the
Republic of Cyprus"); S.C. Res. 550, U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., 2539th mtg. para. 3
(1985); Resolution of Nov. 24, 1983, Committee of Ministers of the European
Parliamentary Assembly, Eur. Parl. Ass., 35th Sess., para. 1, Doc. No. 5165
(1984). Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2224-25
(1996), quotes a European Communities statement of Nov. 16, 1983 and a
Commonwealth Heads of Government press communiqud of Nov. 29, 1983, both
of which iterate non-recognition of the TRNC.
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territory, or claims to some other status or thing-therefore often
may equate to competing regimes of recognition and nonrecognition. How international society regulates widely agreed
regimes of recognition or non-recognition in turn can be
determinative of the outcome of such contests under law.
This Article first reviews earlier U.N. practice regarding nonrecognition. Katanga and Rhodesia presented the first claims to
statehood in the U.N. era that were rejected at the U.N. level for
reasons of international law. The South African "Homelands" and
Namibia involved claims by the apartheid-era government of
South Africa about the legal status of certain territories in
southern Africa that were not all recognized as parts of South
Africa but were all under the de facto control of that state. The
United Nations addressed these situations, too, by legislating
rules of non-recognition. Response to annexation of Kuwait by
Iraq is a further example of the establishment of a regime of nonrecognition at U.N. level.
These and a handful of related
precedents form the core of U.N. practice on non-recognition of
claims to territory and claims to statehood. With that core of
practice in mind, this Article examines how the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), recruited by one state to help enforce a
collective decision to deny recognition to the Indonesian claim
over East Timor, addressed the proposition, implicit in the
pleadings of that state, that breach of a regime of non-recognition
is actionable under international law.

II. THE U.N. SYSTEM AND NON-RECOGNITION
U.N.-sponsored rules of non-recognition up to 1987 were
examined by John Dugard in Recognition and the United
Nations.19 This section briefly reviews these early rules and then
discusses the rule of non-recognition legislated in response to the
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.
A. Katanga and Rhodesia
Two problems of political geography and law contributed to
conflicts in Africa in the decades following the eclipse of European
colonialism.
The alignment of boundaries set in the late

19.
See DUGARD, supra note 13, at 81-122. The treatment of nonrecognition in this generally acclaimed work was particularly wel-received. See
M.J. Peterson, Recognition and the United Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1988)
(book review); Douglas B. Ross, Recognition and the United Nations, 58 BRnT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 374 (1987) (book review); Recognition and the United Nations, 33 ANNUAIRE
FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTL 1056 (1987) (book review).

2000] ENFORCING NON-RECOGNITIONIN INTERNATIONAL LAW

281

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by colonial powers was
one problem. The boundaries were in many instances set without
regard to the political, ethnic, linguistic, or religious affinities of
the indigenous population; yet, in deference to the principle uti
possidetis juris,20 virtually every boundary set by the European
colonial powers was preserved as the boundary of an independent
state after decolonization. 2 1 Thus, in many instances, groups of
people were included in states of which they wanted no part or
excluded from states to which they aspired to belong.
A second problem, contributing to several conflicts, was the
presence in parts of Africa of communities of European settlers
Some of these communities were
and their descendants.
tenacious. Unlike European administrators in other parts of
Africa who could be recalled to the metropole upon the granting of
independence to the territories they administered-and who
mostly, when recalled, in fact went-members of the settler
communities perceived themselves to be in Africa as holders of
title to territory in their own right. Questions of recognition arose
in several situations in which one or the other of the problems
was particularly acute.
The problem of African boundaries has been associated with
a number of ethnic and religious conflicts on the continent. The
Muslim-Christian divide across the Sahel has played out in
several countries as civil conflict, and, in Sudan, it has been a
cause of a long-running civil war.2 2 Ethnic differences in Nigeria
were at the heart of the secession of Biafra from the federation

20.
For a critical view of the principle, see Toms Bartos, Uti Possidetis.
Quo Vadis?, 18 AUsTL. Y.B. INT' L. 37 (1997).
21.
States in Africa on a number of occasions would plead uti possidetis
juris in disputes over border alignments. For example, in pleadings before the ICJ
against Nigeria, Cameroon noted the breadth of the application of the principle in
Africa and alleged that Nigeria had attempted illegally to alter the border between
the two states. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11). Cameroon
stated 'that the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the
fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization." Id.
para. 16. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity and AHG/Res. 16(1) on
respect for boundaries inherited from colonization, as adopted in Cairo on July 21,
See AppZication Instituting
1964, supported application of the principle.
Proceedings, para. 18
(last modified Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.icjApplication Additional to the
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnframe.htm>;
Application Instituting ProceedingsBrought by the Republic of Cameroon, para. 16
(last modified Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/
icnframe.htm>.
22.
In response to evidence of religious persecution by the government of
Sudan, the United States put in place economic sanctions in 1997. See Secretary
of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks on New Economic Sanctions Against
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/
Sudan
(visited
Dec.
5,
1999)
statements/971104.html>.
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and a civil war in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 23 One attempt
to revise colonial boundaries through secession resulted in a rule
of non-recognition. Belgium conceded independence to the Congo
on June 30, 1960. Less than two weeks later, Moise Tshombe, a
regional leader, declared the southeastern province of Katanga an
independent state. 2 4 Possessing a large portion of the mineral
wealth of the Congo, Katanga sought close relations with
European and American mining concerns and with the former
colonial power. This gave rise to charges that the Katangan
government was complicit in a veiled return of colonial rule to the
region.
In any event, the United Nations took the view that Katangan
secession violated the territorial integrity of the Congo, which had
2 S
been admitted to the United Nations a week after independence.
Affirmation of the territorial integrity of the Congo and rejection of
the claim by Katanga to constitute an independent state were
contained in Security
Council
and General Assembly
resolutions. 26
Dugard, who characterizes U.N. response to
Katanga as "the first example of non-recognition of an aspirant
State by the United Nations," points to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 169 of November 24, 1961 as the locus of a rule of
non-recognition. 2 7 The resolution condemned "the secessionist
activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of
Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by
foreign mercenaries" and stated that "all secessionist activities
against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi
fondamentale and Security Council decisions" and "specifically
demand[ed] that such activities which are now taking place in
Katanga shall cease forthwith." 28 The United Nations issued no
explicit statement requiring non-recognition of the putative state
in Katanga, but Dugard nonetheless takes the view that the
Security Council established a rule of non-recognition toward the
secessionist province. U.N. Security Council Resolution 169,
according to Dugard, was tantamount to such a rule. Moreover,
the rule was backed up by armed force and, ultimately, enforced

23.

See JOHN J.

STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN

CIVIL WAR: 1967-1970 (1977).
24.
See THOMAS KANZA, THE RISE AND FALL OF PATRICE LUMUMBA:
THE CONGO 196-203 (1994).

CONFLICT IN

25.
As recommended by S.C. Res. 142, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 872nd mtg.
at 12, U.N. Doc. S/4377 (1965).
26.
See S.C. Res. 145, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 879th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc.
S/4405 (1965); S.C. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 982nd mtg. at 3-5, U.N.
Doc. S/5002 (1965); G.A. Res. 1474, U.N. GAOR, 4th Emergency Special Session,
Supp. No. 1, para. 5(a), U.N. Doc. A/4510 (1960).
27.
DUGARD, supra note 13, at 86.
28.
S.C. Res. 169 (U.N. Doc. S/5002), supranote 26, paras. 1, 8 (emphasis
in original), quoted in DUGARD, supranote 13, at 88.
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successfully. Katanga ended its attempted secession in January
1963.29
Though Belgium kept close relations with the
secessionist entity for a time, no state recognized it. Accordingly,
no chance arose to test how the U.N. system might enforce a rule
of non-recognition against third states intent on recognizing the
situation toward which the rule was directed.
The first explicit U.N.-mandated non-recognition was
promulgated in connection with a case arising from the second
problem of post-colonial Africa identified above.
Settler
communities complicated the process of decolonization in several
parts of Africa. In Algeria, the gulf between the settler and the
French administrator was broad, as the settler communitynumbering over a million-fought to thwart the decision by the
government of France to decolonize. In southern Africa, settler
communities were yet more confirmed in the view that they
inhabited Africa independent of contemporary policies in the
country from which they or their forebears emigrated. This
characteristically took the form of claims that title to African
territory lay with the settler communities.
Some five million
Europeans in South Africa indeed were said by their political
leaders to be the original settlers of the region-a tendentious
history fashioned to invalidate African claims to a share in title to
South Africa and to political equality with whites.3 0 In Rhodesia,
a territory in which British immigrants settled from the late
nineteenth century, the colonial administration excluded Africans
from governmental processes, and, when Great Britain required
reform, the British settler community-numbering around
150,000 in a population of 4.25 million-supported secession of
the territory from the British empire. The government of the
territory on November 11, 1965, issued a Unilateral Declaration

29.
For a discussion of U.N. intervention in the Congo during the period of
the attempted establishment of an independent Katanga, see 3 ROSALYN HIGGINS,
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS & COMMENTARY (1980);
D.W. BowETr,

UNITED NATIONS FORCES:

A LEGAL STUDY 153-254 (1964).

Higgins

and Bowett characterize the intervention as an illegal interference in the internal
affairs of the Congo. Dugard characterizes it as an endorsement of the principle
set forth in G.A. Res. 1514 that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations." G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 5, para. 6. Dugard cites the statement of a
delegate from Liberia as evidence of the link he posits between U.N. nonrecognition of Katanga and the then-emerging U.N. practice on decolonization.
See DUGARD, supra note 13, at 89 (citing Security Council Insists on Ending of
SecessionistActivities in Congo, 8 U.N. REV. 6, 7 (1961)).
30.
On the political utility of certain representations of the past, see
HARVEY J. KAYE, THE POWERS OF THE PAST: REFLECTIONS ON THE CRISIS AND THE
PROMISE OF HISTORY (199 1); KAREN DAWISHA & BRUCE PARROTT, RUSSIA AND THE NEW
STATES OF EURASIA: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 1-56 (1994).
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of Independence (UDI).a3
This presented the international
community with a question of recognition. The act of secession
violated the long-standing rule, active in the Katanga case, that
violations of the territorial integrity of a state are delicts and also
violated the emerging rule that a claim to statehood may fail if it
is predicated on illegal acts-including, probably, systematic
denial of political rights on the basis of race.3 2 The United
Nations from 1965 to 1980 maintained a rule of non-recognition
toward the putative state of Rhodesia. Shortly before the UDI, the
General Assembly called on "all States . . . not to recognize any
government in Southern Rhodesia which is not representative of
the majority of the people." 33 U.N. Security Council Resolution
216, "call[ed] upon all States not to recognize this illegal racist
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. " 4 U.N. Security Council
Resolution 217, determining that the situation in Rhodesia
threatened international peace and security, called upon "all
States not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain
any diplomatic or other relations with it." 3 5 The non-recognition
rule was made comprehensive by the imposition of economic

31. See VERA GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO ILLEGAL ACTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

181 (1990); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United
Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INTL L. 1 (1968);
MICHAEL CHARLTON, THE LAST COLONY IN AFRICA: DIPLOMACY AND THE INDEPENDENCE

OF RHODESIA (1990); Christopher Ashley Ford, Defensor Fidei: Explaining South
African Foreign Policy Behavior: The Case of Ian Smith's Rhodesia (1989)
(unpublished A.B. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard University
Library).
32.
Thus, could an entity such as Rhodesia satisfy the "traditional" criteria
for statehood set forth in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 yet be denied
recognition as a state? Writers widely agreed that Rhodesia satisfied the
Montevideo criteria.
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1979); D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAw 91 (3d ed. 1983); C.B. MARSHALL, CRISIS OVER RHODESIA: A SKEPTICAL VIEW 6869 (1967), cited in DUGARD, supra note 13, at 91 n.51; CHRIS N. OKEKE,
CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-89 (1974); D.J.
Devine, The Status of Rhodesia in InternationalLaw, 1973 ACTA JURIDICA 1, 78-89;
Isaak I. Dore, Recognition of Rhodesia and Traditional InternationalLaw: Some
ConceptualProblems, 13 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 33-38 (1980); J.E.S. Fawcett,
Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INTIL L. 103, 110 (1968).
For an argument that the Montevideo Convention no longer accurately reflects
international practice regarding the creation and recognition of new states, see
Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403 (1999).
33.
G.A. Res. 2022, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, para. 9, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1966).
34.
S.C. Res. 216, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1258th mtg. para. 2 (1967). The
term "Southern Rhodesia" denoted the territory under the effective control of the
illegal Smith government. "Northern Rhodesia" had gained independence as
Zambia in 1964 and had been admitted to the United Nations on December 1,
1964. See Devine, supranote 32, at 12.
35.
S.C. Res. 217, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1265th mtg. para. 6 (1967).
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sanctions 3 6 and by a later resolution containing a more detailed
non-recognition directive. U.N. Security Council Resolution 277
of March 18, 1970 read in pertinent part:
[The Security Council reaffirming] that the present situation in
Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and

security,

37

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
of the
1. Condemns the illegal proclamation of republican status
38
Territory by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia;
2. Decides that Member States shall refrain from recognizing this
illegal regime or from rendering any assistance to it;
3. Calls upon Member States to take appropriate measures, at the
national level, to ensure that any act performed by officials and
institutions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia shall not
be accorded any recognition, official or otherwise, including
39
....
judicial notice, by the competent organs of their State;

See S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg. para. 2 (1968);
36.
S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23rd Sess., 1428th mtg. para. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1970).
S.C. Res. 277, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1535th mtg. at 5-6 (1971).
37.
The government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia had claimed that the state it
38.
governed still recognized the Queen as the head of the Commonwealth, despite the
UDI. This position changed in 1970 when the Smith government declared
Rhodesia a republic. International practice toward Rhodesia varied and was, in
instances, ambivalent on the distinction between recognition of the government of
Ian Smith and recognition of the putative state of Rhodesia. U.N. instruments
regarding Rhodesia, such as U.N. Security Council Resolution 277, referred to the
situation as one involving non-recognition of an "illegal regime.' S.C. Res. 277,
But writers, including Dugard and Devine, who
supra note 37, para. 2.
represented divergent political views agreed that statehood was the matter really
at stake. See DUGARD, supranote 13, at 93-94. According to Dugard, the United
Nations referred to the 'rdgime" and 'govermen" in Rhodesia, rather than the
astate" of Rhodesia, in order to preserve the legal status of Rhodesia as a British
colony under the U.N. Charter Chapter XI system of non-self-governing territories
(NSGTs). See id. at 94. The special status of NSGTs has been noted elsewhere.
See, e.g., Grant, supra note 5. To have acknowledged explicitly that statehood was
at issue might have complicated the claim that Rhodesia was an NSGT. Dugard
further points out that U.N. Security Resolution 277, in calling for the suspension
of Rhodesian membership in the specialized agencies of the United Nations and
denial of Rhodesian membership in other multilateral organizations, showed that
the controversy concerned recognition of the state, not the government, of
Rhodesia. See DUGARD, supra note 13, at 94. States are international legal
Membership in
persons; governments are their representatives or agents.
multilateral organizations is held by states, not by their governments.
There was some concern after Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, N.O.,
39.
1968 (2) SALR 284 (A), and R. v. Ndhlovu, 1968 (4) SALR 515 (A), in which the
Rhodesia judiciary affirmed the legality of the UDI, that courts in Britain and the
Commonwealth might regard those precedents as persuasive.
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Decides, in accordance with Article 4140 of the Charter and in
furthering the objective of ending the rebellion, that Member
States shall:
(a) Immediately sever all diplomatic, consular, trade,
military and other relations that they may have with
the illegal rdgime in Southern Rhodesia, and terminate
any representation that they may maintain in the
Territory; ....

12. Calls upon Member States to take appropriate action to
suspend any membership or associate membership that the
illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia has in the specialized
agencies of the United Nations;
13. Urges Member States of any international or regional
organizations to suspend the membership of the illegal regime
of Southern Rhodesia from their respective organizations and
4 1
to refuse any request for membership from that r~gime.

Practice of individual states, especially the United Kingdom,
affirmed non-recognition. 4 2
The rule of non-recognition of Rhodesia was respected by
all-or nearly all-states. No state expressly recognized Rhodesia
or the government of Ian Smith. South Africa and Portugal,
which until 1975 administered neighboring Mozambique,
maintained diplomatic relations with Rhodesia, in violation of
paragraph 9(a) of Resolution 277, though even these relations
were not at the ambassadorial level and in time were
terminated. 43 Non-recognition of Rhodesia did not produce a
clear test of third-state obligation. Two ambiguous cases did
arise-South Africa and Portugal in their relations with the
putative state-but neither South Africa nor Portugal were
sanctioned by the United Nations expressly for their dealings with
40.

U.N. CHARTER art. 41 states:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
41.
S.C. Res. 277, supranote 37.
42.
Dugard cites a certificate presented to the court by the United Kingdom
in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, N.O., 1968 (2) SALR 284 (A). See DUGARD,
supra note 13, at 95 ('Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom does not
recognise Southern Rhodesia or Rhodesia as a State either defacto or dejure.").
43.
For a comprehensive examination of relations between Rhodesia and
other states, see HARRY R. STRACK, SANCTIONS: THE CASE OF RHODESIA 66-84 (1978).
On whether South African relations with Rhodesia might have amounted to
implicit recognition, see John Dugard, Rhodesia:Does South Africa Recognize It as
an Independent State? 94 S. AFR. L.J. 127 (1977). Christopher Ford examines at
length the shift in South African policy toward severing ties with and joining the
embargo against Rhodesia. See Ford, supra note 31.
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Rhodesia. The rule of non-recognition of Rhodesia was made
robust by a system of sanctions in which nearly every state
participated. Unclear is whether and how the rule would have
been enforced if a third state had endeavored unambiguously to
breach it.
B. South African 'Homelands"
With the apparent goal of denying South African citizenship
to all black inhabitants of the country, the government of South
Africa during the period of apartheid organized four "Homelands"
and six "self-governing territories" on the territory of South Africa,
and compelled black South Africans to take citizenship in the new
entities. The "Homelands" were the Transkei, the Ciskei,
Bophuthatswana, and Venda. The self-governing territories were
KwaZulu, KaNgwane, Gazankulu, Lebowa, KwaNdebele, and

Qwaqwa. 44 Multiple U.N. resolutions stated a rule of nonrecognition regarding the "Homelands," the establishment of each
"Homeland" occasioning further U.N. clarifications. 45
U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 31/6A (1976) termed the putative
Transkei state "invalid" and called upon all states to "deny any
form of recognition to the so-called independent Transkei."46 The
establishment of the putative state of Bophuthatswana in 1977
led the General Assembly to call on states to deny recognition to
any putative "Homeland" states.47 Establishment of Venda in

44.
During the transition to majority rule, writers acknowledged that the
arrangement would require resolution under the new constitution since these
entities were part of the apartheid constitutive order.
See, e.g., Lakshman
Marasinghe, Constitutional Reform in South Africa, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 827
(1993). Concerning the effects of the homelands on citizenship, see John Dugard,
South Africa's 'Independent' Home-lands: An Exercise in Denationalization, 10
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 11, 21-35 (1980); John Dugard, The Denationalizationof
Black South Africans in Pursuance of Apartheid: A Question for the International
Court of Justice? 33 REV. INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS 49 (1984).
45.
This practice is discussed in DUGARD, supra note 13, at 100-02.
46.
G.A. Res. 31/6 A, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, paras. 2-3,
U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977).
47.
See G.A. Res. 32/105 N, U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess., Supp. No. 45, para.
5, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978). With U.N. General Assembly Res. 3411 D of Nov.
28, 1975, the General Assembly had already condemned establishment of the
Bantustans and called upon all states to deny them recognition. See G.A. Res.
3411 D, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/ 10034 (1976).
Subsequently, Resolution 31/6 A of Oct. 26, 1976 (entitled "Policies of Apartheid
of the Government of South Africa-The So-Called 'Independent' Transkei and
Other Bantustans") called upon all states to deny the Transkei "any form of
recognition" and endorsed the non-recognition rule set forth in G.A. Res. 3411 D.
The Security Council also commended Lesotho for declining to recognize the
Transkei and appealed to states to assist Lesotho to protect it from the material
consequences of South African countermeasures. See S.C. Res. 402, U.N. SCOR,
31st Sess., 1982nd mtg. paras. 2, 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1977). See also G.A.
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1979 led the President of the Security Council to state on behalf
of the Council:
The Security Council condemns the proclamation of the socalled "independence" of Venda and declares it totally invalid. This
action by the South African rdgime, following similar proclamations
of Transkei and Bophuthatswana, denounced by the international
community, is designed to divide and dispossess the African people
and establish client states under its domination in order to
perpetuate apartheid. It further aggravates the situation in the
region and hinders international efforts for just and lasting
solutions.
The Security Council calls upon all Governments to deny any
form of recognition to the so-called "independent" bantustans; to
refrain from any dealings with them; to reject travel documents
issued by them; and urges Member Governments to take effective
measures to prohibit all individuals, corporations and other
institutions under their jurisdiction from having any dealings with
48
the so-called "independent" bantustans.

Notwithstanding these statements and related resolutions, it
remained open to question whether a rule of non-recognition,
binding on states, had been established. Dugard noted that none
of the resolutions were issued pursuant to Chapter VII of the
Charter, under which the Security Council, after determining that
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
has transpired, may issue resolutions binding on the member
states. 4 9 He added that "[t]his does not necessarily mean that
States are not under any legal obligation to withhold recognition
of the homeland-States."5 0
The comprehensive system of
sanctions against South Africa and the condemnation of
apartheid contained in multiple U.N. resolutions combined,
Dugard wrote, to make the non-recognition statements
mandatory.5 1
In any event, no state besides South Africa
accepted the claim that the "Homelands" constituted independent
states. Thus, rather as happened with Rhodesia, no clear case
presented itself to test whether the United Nations would enforce
non-recognition-except in the case of recognition of the
"Homelands" by South Africa itself.

Res. 2775 E, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1972) (condemning South Africa's establishment of the Bantu homelands).
48.
S.C. Res., 2168th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/13549, Sept. 21, 1979, quoted in
DUGARD, supra note 13, at 101. See also G.A. Res. 34/93 G, U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Supp. No. 46, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980) (denouncing putative
independence of Venda). A similar statement was issued in connection with the
Ciskei. See Statement of the President of the Security Council, on Behalf of the
Council, Concerning the Proclamationof the "Independent"State of Ciskei, U.N. Doc.
5/14794, Dec. 15, 1981.
49.
See DUGARD, supra note 13, at 102.
50.
Id.
51.
See id. at 102.
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Though South Africa was subject to a comprehensive regime
of sanctions, it would be misleading to say that this was chiefly to
enforce non-recognition of the "Homelands." The United Nations
addressed the "Homelands" as part of a larger set of human rights
violations in South Africa.
This is not to ignore that the
derogation of territorial integrity that would have been worked by
the putative new states was a point of objection by some
governments 52 -and, at least in connection with Namibia, by the
United Nations itself.5 3 At the end of the day, however, South
Africa was sanctioned for apartheid, of which the "Homelands"
were one instrumentality. There was indeed a U.N.-legislated rule
of non-recognition regarding the "Homelands," and the United
54
Nations did in fact institute sanctions against South Africa.
The "Homelands" precedent, however, does not convincingly show
that the United Nations imposes sanctions against a state for
ss
violating a rule of non-recognition.
C. Namibia
A German colony before World War I, the territory then called
South West Africa had been seized by South Africa in 1915. By
terms of the mandate system established under Article 22 of the
League of Nations Covenant, South West Africa was placed under
South African administration. The territory was one of only two
Mandates to survive the dissolution of the League of Nations

52.
See, e.g., Recognition, 7 AUsTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 430 (1981) (Senator
representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia stating the Australian
view that the "Bantustan' policy would lead to "the fragmentation of the South
African state").
53.
In Security Council Resolution 264 of March 20, 1969, the Security
Council observed in paragraph four that "the actions of the Government of South
Africa designed to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia
through the establishment of Bantustans are contrary to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations." S.C. Res. 264, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., 1465th
mtg. para. 4 (1970).
54.
See SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID (Mark Orkin ed., 1990); UNITED
NATIONS, SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: THE PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO VIOLENT

CHANGE, U.N. Sales No. E.88.1.5 (1988).
55.
It does furnish, however, the only case of the United Nations rewarding
a state for adhering to a rule of non-recognition. Lesotho, a state member of the
United Nations landlocked within South Africa, had a border with the putative
state of the Transkei. Lesotho complained to the Security Council that South
Africa was endeavoring to coerce Lesotho into recognizing the Transkei. Security
Council Resolution 402 of December 22, 1976 "commended" Lesotho for
withholding recognition and called on states to render economic assistance to
Lesotho to make up for losses incurred by South African retaliation. S.C. Res.
402, supra note 47. Dugard discusses the Transkei in DUGARD, supra note 13, at
81-82, 98-108, and in JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
ORDER 91-92, 94-96, 110-11 (1978).
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without being transferred to the U.N. Trusteeship system.5 6
South Africa requested permission to annex the territory, but the
General Assembly refused in 1946.5 7
South Africa claimed
authority to continue the supervisory functions of the Mandate
and was initially supported in this endeavor by the International
Court of Justice in the Status Opinion.5 8
After it became
apparent, however, that South Africa was not promoting
development of the mandated territory toward self-governance as
the Mandate obliged, the General Assembly declared on October
27, 1966 the Mandate for South West Africa revoked.5 9 The
Security Council called upon South Africa to end its
administration of the territory, which, now lacking the Mandate,
lacked basis in international law.60 South Africa nonetheless
continued to administer the territory. The U.N. Security Council
in Resolution 276 of January 30, 1970 gave notification that "all
acts taken by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or
concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are
illegal and invalid." 6 ' This was expressed as a policy of nonrecognition in U.N. Security Council Resolution 283 of July 29,
1970.
That South Africa occupied Namibia illegally was
confirmed by the International Court of Justice in Legal
Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970).62 The Court held that U.N. member states
must
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and
the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and...
refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the
Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of,
or lending support or assistance to, such presence and
63
administration.

The Court, General Assembly, and Security Council urged that no
state take measures tending to recognize or support the South
African presence in Namibia. The scope of the rule of nonrecognition toward South African presence in Namibia may have

56.
57.
58.

The other was Palestine. See DUGARD, supra note 13, at 60, 117.
See G.A. Res. 65, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1947).
See International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July

11).
59.
See G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, para. 4, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967).
60.
See S.C. Res. 264, supra note 53, para. 2; S.C. Res. 269, U.N. SCOR,
24th Sess., 1497th mtg. para. 5 (1970).
61.
S.C. Res. 276, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1529th mtg. para. 2 (1971).
62.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970) [hereinafter Legal Consequences], 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
63.
Id. at 58.
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been limited somewhat by the provision that measures against
South Africa should be fashioned so as to avoid detriment to the
inhabitants of Namibia. 6 4 The operation of the rule was certainly
left in doubt, as the U.N. organs left unclear how, if at all, the rule
of non-recognition would be policed. Whether a U.N. nonrecognition regime might be enforced by a member state harmed
by illegal recognition was never tested in connection with
Namibia.
D. Israel and Cyprus

In connection with rules of non-recognition, Dugard
discussed a number of further cases, up to 1987, including
claims of territorial acquisition by Israel to East Jerusalem65 and
the Golan Heights 6 6 and claims of statehood of the Turkish
67
Republic of Northern Cyprus.
East Jerusalem is a territory of ambiguous legal status. Part
of the British Palestine Mandate, it was taken by Jordan in 1948
during hostilities surrounding the establishment of the state of
Israel. It was, in turn, taken by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War. U.N. Security Council Resolution 478 of August 20, 1980
stated that it does not "recognize .

.

. actions by Israel that...

seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem" and called
upon states to withdraw any diplomatic missions from Jerusalem.
Meanwhile, the Golan Heights were legally part of Syria and
controlled by Syria until occupied by Israel during the 1967 war.
The General Assembly called Israel's occupation "illegal and
invalid" and called on states not to recognize it.6 8 Some states

64.

See Legal Consequences, 1971 I.C.J. at 56:

In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration of the
Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any
advantages derived from international co-operation. In particular, while
official acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or
concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and
invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for
instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of
which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the

Territory.
Id. at 56. An advocate of the East Timorese position in international law notes
these limitations and takes the view that they are consistent with non-recognition.
See Roger S. Clark, Timor Gap: The Legality of the Treaty on the Zone of
Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and
Northern Australia,4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 69, 89 & n.79 (1992).
65.
See DUGARD, supra note 13, at 111-15.
66.
See id. at 115.
67.
See id. at 108-11.
68.
G.A. Res. 37/123A, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, para. 5, U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1983).
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defied Security Council Resolution 478, keeping embassies in the
Holy City. No state has recognized de jure Israel's presence on
the Golan Heights. At the level of a regional organization, the rule
of non-recognition was enforced by the threat of expulsion-a
threat that went beyond recognition of the incorporation of the
occupied territories into Israel and indeed extended to recognition
of Israel itself 6 9 -but no attempt to enforce the rule of nonrecognition as regards East Jerusalem seems to have been made
at U.N. level. No occasion for enforcement has been afforded in
regard to the Golan Heights, as no state has recognized Israeli
title to that territory.
Turkish Northern Cyprus, created following hostilities on
Cyprus and an invasion by forces of Turkey in July 1974, was
first fashioned as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975),
then, on November 15, 1983, as the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey recognized the TRNC. U.N. Security
Council Resolution 541 of November 18, 1983 labeled the TRNC
"legally invalid" and called upon states "not to recognize any
Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus."70 Recognition
of the TRNC by Turkey was emphasized when Turkey and the
TRNC exchanged ambassadors in 1984. The Security Council,
arguably in enforcement of Resolution 541, condemned the
exchange. 7 ' Security Council reaction to the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Turkey and the TRNC thus affords
one of the few examples before East Timor to suggest how a
system might be developed to enforce rules of non-recognition
against states in breach.
E. Kuwait

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.72 This undertaking
did not have the endorsement of any multilateral organization,
nor did it take place in response to a threat to Iraq having the
immediacy requisite under the rule of self-defense classically set

69.
Seventeen members of the League of Arab States broke diplomatic
relations with Egypt and the membership of Egypt in the organization was
suspended as a sanction for Egypt's recognition of Israel. Egypt did not recognize
Israeli title to the occupied territories. See Saudi Embassy Restored in Egypt, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 18, 1987, at C18; What's News-World-wide, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17,
1987, at 1 (noting that Bahrain and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations
with Egypt after an eight-year suspension).
70.
S.C. Res. 541, supranote 18, para. 7.
71.
See S.C. Res. 550, supra note 18, para. 2; DUGARD, supra note 13, at
109-10.
See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 30, U.N.
72.
Doc. A/46/2 (1993).
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forth in the Caroline case. 7 3 Shortly after the invasion, which
rapidly defeated Kuwaiti resistance and led to occupation of the
territory of Kuwait, Iraq organized a referendum in Kuwait. This
was not monitored by any external observers. Many persons who
were not citizens of Kuwait voted in it, while many persons who
were Kuwaiti citizens were excluded from voting in it. 7 4 The
purport of the referendum was that Kuwait should be annexed to
Iraq as the latter's nineteenth province in a "comprehensive and
eternal merger. "7 5 This was accomplished on August 7, 1990.76
The Security Council condemned the Iraqi invasion and its
results. 77 In a number of resolutions, the Security Council called
on states to deny recognition of the results of the Iraqi invasion.
Before Iraq declared the annexation of Kuwait, U.N. Security
Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990 called upon all states

73.
Under the Caroline rule, a state may resort to force when there can be
shown a 'necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation." R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod
Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938) (quoting the source of the Caroline rule, a
letter from U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster to the British Minister in
Washington on Apr. 24, 1841).
74.
The U.N. Security Council condemned "the attempts by Iraq to alter the
demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil
records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait." S.C. Res. 677,
reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/46/2, supra note 72, at 84. For a general discussion of
when self-defense may be invoked as justification for a use of force, see J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE,
397-432 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
75.
S.C. Res. 662, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/46/2, supra note 72, at 38; see
also Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., 23rd mtg. at 56-70, U.N. Doc. A/45/PV.23 (1990), reprinted in THE KUWAIT
CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 191-93 (E. Lauterpacht et al. eds., 1991).
For a
reiteration of the historico-legal argument advanced by Iraq in defense of
annexation, see Letter from the Ministerfor ForeignAffairs of Iraq addressed to the
Secretary-General,21 May 1992, U.N. Doc. S/24044 (1992), reprinted in IRAQ AND
KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH 439-48 (Marc Weller ed., 1993).
76.
See Identical Letters from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed Respectively to the Secretary-Generaland the President
of the Security Council, 22 Mar. 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22396 (1991) (noting the
rescinding of the decision of the Iraqi National Council of August 7, 1990 to annex
Kuwait), reprintedin IRAQ AND KUWAIT, supra note 75, at 396.
77.
See S.C. Res. 660, supra note 72 (characterizing invasion as breach of
international law); S.C. Res. 661, reprintedin U.N. Doc. A/46/2, supra note 72, at
34 (establishing embargo against Iraq and Kuwait); S.C. Res. 662, supra note 75,
para. 3 (condemning annexation of Kuwait); S.C. Res. 665, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
A/46/2, supra note 72, at 53 (establishing naval blockade of Iraq and Kuwait);
S.C. Res. 667, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/46/2, supra note 72, at 67 (condemning
mistreatment of diplomatic personnel by Iraq in Kuwait); S.C. Res. 677, supra
note 74, para. 1 (condemning 'attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic
composition of the population of Kuwait"); S.C. Res. 678, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
A/46/2, supra note 72, at 85 (authorizing Member States of the United Nations,
starting January 15, 1991, to use 'all necessary means" to restore control of the
territory of Kuwait to the government of Kuwait, if Iraq had not complied with the
provisions of S.C. Res. 660 requiring it to withdraw from Kuwait by that date).
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"[niot to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power [in
Kuwait]." 7 8 Moreover, the resolution required states to recognize
only the "legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies" as
79
regarded control of financial and other assets.
The purported annexation of the territory precipitated a
definitive statement of non-recognition, contained in U.N.
Security Council Resolution 662 of August 9, 1990. "Gravely
alarmed by the declaration of Iraq of a 'comprehensive and
eternal merger' with Kuwait," the Security Council "[clail[ed] upon
all States, international organizations and specialized agencies
not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action
or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of
the annexation." 80 This language, especially when viewed in light
of the boycott set forth in Resolution 661, encompassing both
Iraq and Kuwait, was arguably the most far-reaching and decisive
statement of non-recognition in the history of the Security
Council. While the rule of non-recognition toward South African
presence in Namibia was also comprehensive, it did contain the
reservation that its implementation should not act to the
detriment of the Namibian people. Though protection of the
welfare of the people of Kuwait was an explicit objective in U.N.
action, no limitation on the rule of non-recognition was expressed
in this connection. That the embargo established under U.N.
Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990 applied
equally over the territories of Iraq and Kuwait again underlines
the scope in this case of the U.N.-sponsored rule of nonrecognition. Further Security Council resolutions reprised the
non-recognition rule-Resolution 664 of August 18, 1990 in
particular-terming the annexation of Kuwait "null and void." 8 '
Regional multilateral organizations, especially the League of Arab
States and the Gulf Co-Operation Council, confirmed the U.N.
non-recognition rule with their own statements of non-

recognition.

82

78.
S.C. Res. 661, supranote 77, para. 9(b).
79.
Id. para. 9(a).
80.
S.C. Res. 662, supranote 75 (emphasis added).
81.
S.C. Res. 661, reprintedin U.N. Doc. A/46/2, supranote 72, at 45.
82.
See Resolution 3036 Adopted at the ExtraordinarySession of the Council
of the League of Arab States, Cairo, 2 Aug. 1990, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/21434,
reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 293 ("condemn[ing] the Iraqi
aggression against the State of Kuwait ....
reject[ing] any effects it might entail
and ... withhold[ing] recognition of its consequences"); Resolution 195 Adopted at
the ExtraordinaryArab Summit of 10 Aug. 1990, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/21500,
reprinted in THE KuwAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 294 (deciding "not to recognise
the Iraqi decision to annex Kuwait or any consequences arising from the invasion
of Iraqi troops of Kuwaiti territory.'); The Iraqi Aggression Against the State of
Kuwait, Council of the League of Arab States Res./5037/ES (Aug. 31, 1990), para.
4, U.N. Doc. S/21693, reprinted in THE KuwAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 296
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Previous U.N.-sponsored rules of non-recognition, with the
limited exception of Katanga, had been enforced, if at all, only by
sanctions against the object of non-recognition. By contrast, the
rule regarding Kuwait was accompanied by robust enforcement
mechanisms going well beyond sanctions. To wit, the member
states of the United Nations enforced, through air, land, and sea
blockade, the embargo against trade to and from Iraq and the
illegally occupied territory. Thus, any commerce that might have
lent support to the Iraqi claim to title to Kuwait was prevented.
Moreover, after January 15, 1991 an alliance of member states, in
accordance with the deadline set in U.N. Security Council

(calling on "all States and all international and regional organizations to refrain
from any action or dealings which might be interpreted as an implicit recognition
of [Iraqi tampering with the demographic composition or administrative structure
of Kuwait]"); Statement of the MinisterialCouncil of the Gulf Co-OperationCouncil at
its Meeting Held in Cairo, Egypt, 3 Aug. 1990, U.N. Doc. S/21430, reprinted in THE
KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 302 ("The Council rejects this act of aggression
and any effects to which it may give rise and will not recognize its consequences.");
Final Communiqud Issued by the Twelfth ExtraordinaryMinisterial Council Meeting
of the Gulf Co-Operation Council Held at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 7 Aug. 1990, U.N.
Doc. S/21468, reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS, supranote 75, at 303 ("The Council
affinms its rejection of this aggression and of any effects to which it may give rise
and its non-recognition of its consequences."); Final Communiqud Issued by the
Thirty-Sixth Session of the MinisterialCouncil of the Gulf Co-Operation Council Held
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 6 Sept. 1990, U.N. Doc. S/21719, reprinted in THE
KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 303 ("reaffin-m[ing] that it is essential to
ensure... non-recognition of Iraq's decision to annex Kuwait and of any other
consequences following on the invasion by Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti territory");
Communiqud Issued in Cairo by the Nineteenth InterministerialConference of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference Concerning the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, 6 Aug.
1990, U.N. Doc. S/21448 ("condemn[ing] the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait...
[and] reject[ing] and declar[ing] null and void the consequences stemming
therefrom"), reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 306; Statement on
the Crisis in the PersianGulf Adopted by the Meeting of Ministers of ForeignAffairs
and Heads of Delegation of Non-Aligned Countriesat the Forty-Fifth Session of the
General Assembly, New York, 4 Oct. 1990, U.N. Doc. A/45/585, S/21849,
reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 306 ("emphasiz[ing] that these
acts are unacceptable, null and void"); DecisionAdopted by the PermanentCouncil
of the Organization of American States, 22 Aug. 1990, U.N. Doc. S/21665,
reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 307 (repudiating the annexation
of Kuwait); Declaration on the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict Issued at the Nordic Foreign
Ministers' Meeting, 12 Sept. 1990, U.N. Doc. S/21751, reprinted in THE KUWAIT
CRISIS, supra note 75, at 308 (noting that the Nordic countries had implemented
"stringent boycott provisions" and "reject[ing] all attempts on the part of the Iraqi
authorities to exercise governmental authority in Kuwait"); Statement by the
Twelve Member States of the European Community Issued Within the Framework of
European Political Cooperation, Statement Following the Rome Meeting, 4 Aug.
1990, U.N. Doc. A/45/383, S/21444, reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note
75, at 308 ("[The Twelve] will refrain from any act which may be considered as
implicit recognition of authorities imposed in Kuwait by the invaders"); Declaration
Following the ExtraordinaryEPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 10 Aug. 1990, U.N.
Doc. A/45/409, S/21502), reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS, supra note 75, at 309

("[The Twelve] reject the announced annexation of Kuwait which is contrary to
international law and therefore null and void.").
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Resolution 678, began a military action, Operation Desert Storm,
with the aim and result of expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait and
restoring the Government of Kuwait to its state territory. A rule
of non-recognition was thus announced and enforced, preventing
the crystallization under law of Iraqi claims to the territory of
Kuwait and ending the de facto expression of those claims.
Breaches of the rule of non-recognition, which may have taken
place, were not opposed through formal proceedings but, rather,
circumscribed in their effect by the thoroughness of the blockade
against Iraq and the swiftness of the reversal of the results of the
83
Iraqi invasion.

III. EAST TIMOR
Case Concerning East Timor (Port.v. Austl.) called on the ICJ
to address the legal effect of certain U.N. resolutions. 8 4 Portugal
claimed these resolutions to oblige non-recognition of Indonesia's
annexation of East Timor and acknowledgment of Portugal as
administering power for that territory.8 5
East 7imor was

83.
Opponents of international action against Iraq included Jordan and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Neither however recognized the
annexation of Kuwait or endorsed the aggressive acts leading to annexation.
Mauritania, Cuba, Yemen, Libya, and the Sudan were others among the small
number of states critical of the regime against Iraq. None of the states active in
the establishment and enforcement of the regime brought actions against any of
these critics. For a representative division of opinion, see Res. 3036, supra note
82. The resolution condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iraq, Mauritania,
Yemen, and the Sudan voted against it; the PLO and Jordan approved it but with
reservations; Libya abstained. See id.
84.
See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June
30).
85.
The objects of recognition may be divided into four categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.

New states;
Extra-constitutional changes of government;
Changes of territorial possession; and
Claims of belligerent status by insurgent movements within a
recognized state.

See Edwin L. Fountain, Note, Out from the Precarious Orbit of Politics:
ReconsideringRecognition and the Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue in U.S.
Courts, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 473, 476 n.10 (1989). East Timor concerned the third
category. The case, like the cases of Namibia and the Middle Eastern territories
noted earlier in this Article, did not concern recognition of a claim to statehood,
strictly speaking, though underlying it was an unrealized claim to statehood by
the East Timorese. Recognition may well mean different things for different
categories of objects. Whatever the object of recognition, however, recognition
involves acknowledging a new situation containing an international dimension,
and it makes some aspect of the situation opposable against the recognizing state.
East Timor and ICJ treatment of the Portuguese claim regarding it are instructive
about enforcement of non-recognition regimes.
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therefore-potentially, at any rate-a test case for the competence
of the U.N. as an organ of collective recognition.
A. HistoricalBackground
East Timor was a vestigial appendage of a Portuguese empire
that, built upon trade routes of the late fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, had once spanned the globe. Even after the loss of
Brazil in 1822, Portugal had retained extensive but moribund
colonies in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau),
enclaves on the coasts of the Indian subcontinent (Diu, Daman,
Goa, and Coganada), and the East Asian possessions of Macau
and East Timor. While Macau reverted to Chinese control in
1999, Portugal lost all of its other possessions by the mid-1970s.
Political upheaval gripped Portugal in the early 1970s, and,
among other repercussions, this accelerated retreat from colonial
dominion.8 6 Guinea-Bissau gained independence in September
87
1974; Angola and Mozambique followed the next year.
Timorese independence, however, was not to be perfected.
Indonesia, a resource-rich state occupying an immense
archipelago, had inherited control of the western half of the island
of Timor from the Netherlands."8 Despite the marginal economic
value of East Timor in proportion to its extant possessions,
Indonesia overran the territory in winter 1975-1976 and quickly
set about to eradicate indigenous opposition. In the face of the
invasion and a Timorese uprising at least partly orchestrated by
Indonesia, Portuguese authorities evacuated the territory capital,
Dili, and fled to the small nearby island of Atauro. They left
Atauro shortly thereafter, thus ending all trace of Portuguese
effective governmental power in that part of the world.

86.
General Salazar, long time military dictator of Portugal, suffered a
debilitating stroke in September 1968. The prime minister, Caetano, formed a
government and became head of state upon Salazar's death in July 1970.
Caetano in April 1974 was ousted in a socialist coup known as the "Carnation
Revolution." The new government enacted the Law of 27 July 1974 acknowledging
that all non-self-governing territories under Portuguese administration had a right
to self-determination, including a right to independence. A summary of this
history appears in Case Concerning East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 115 (Oda, J.,
separate opinion).
87.
Guinea-Bissaua gained independence on September 10, 1974,
Mozambica on June 25, 1975, and Angola on November 11, 1975. See The World
Factbook 1999 (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/
factbook>.
88.
Indonesia gained independence in 1949, after thwarting two desultory
police actions by the Netherlands. See WILFRED T. NEILL, TWENTIETH CENTURY
INDONESIA 323-32 (1973); see also R.D. Lumb, The Delimitation of Maritime
Boundaries in the Timor Sea, 7 AUsTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 72 (1981) (summarizing political
history of Timor).
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East Timor immediately became a subject of U.N. concern.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 384 of December 22, 1975 and
the first of eight U.N. General Assembly Resolutions called for
Indonesian withdrawal from the territory. 8 9 The resolutions also
called for "all States to respect the territorial integrity of East
Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to selfdetermination." 90 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3485 (XXX)
of December 12, 1975 referred to Portugal as the "administering
Power" for East Timor. 9 1 The Security Council followed up its
first resolution with a second, Resolution 389 of April 22, 1976,

condemning unanimously the Indonesian invasion. 92 Resolutions
in the ensuing years rejected the incorporation of East Timor into
Indonesia and continued to express that the organization would
not recognize a political situation in East Timor achieved by force
of arms. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 37/30 of November
23, 1982 was the last.9 3 Nonetheless, the question of East Timor
remained alive before the United Nations in a number of forms.
The General Assembly agenda still included it, as did the list of
non-self-governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of
the U.N. Charter.9 4 The Special Committee on the Situation with
Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was still
seized of the East Timor question. And the Secretary-General
continued to consult with concerned parties on the matter.9 s
Portugal itself would maintain a degree of pressure against
Indonesia for its allegedly unlawful annexation of East Timor, but,
though the international community widely accepted the

89.
See S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg. (1976). The
first General Assembly Resolution was G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/ 10034 (1976). It was followed by G.A. Res. 31/53, U.N.
GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977); G.A. Res. 32/34, U.N.
GAOR, 32nd Sess., Supp. No. 45, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978); G.A. Res. 33/39,
U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979); G.A. Res. 34/40
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); G.A. Res.
35/27, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981); G.A.
Res. 36/50, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982); and
G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/37/51
(1983). For a discussion of relevant U.N. practice, see Roger S. Clark, The
'Decolonisation'of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination
and Aggression, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR 65
(Catholic Inst. for Int'l Relations & Int'l Platform of Jurists for East Timor eds.,

1995).
90.
S.C. Res. 384, supranote 89, para. 1.
91.
G.A. Res. 3485, supra note 89.
92.
See S.C. Res. 389, supranote 12.
93.
See G.A. Res. 37/30, supranote 89.
94.
East Timor had been declared a non-self-governing territory. See G.A.
Res. 1542, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961).

95.

See Case Concerning East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 97.
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96
Portuguese contention that Indonesia holds East Timor illegally,
few concrete measures were taken to sanction the delinquency.
Australia did, arguably, quite the opposite. Though Australia had
voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution 3485 of December
12, 1975, it abstained from the vote on Resolution 31/53 of
December 1, 1976 and Resolution 32/34 of November 28, 1977.
With General Assembly Resolution 33/39 of December 13, 1978,
Australia shifted further from its earlier participation in the
censure of Indonesian conduct.
Australia voted against
Resolution 33/39, and in connection with its vote, the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs stated, "The text of the Resolution
did not reflect a realistic appreciation of the situation in East
97
Timor and no practical purpose was served by the Resolution."
Australia announced on February 14, 1979 that it recognized de
98
jure the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia.
The government of Australia concluded a maritime
delimitation treaty with Indonesia on December 11, 1989.
Entitled Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, the
instrument set up a three-part division of the maritime zone
between the East Timorese and Australian coasts. To manage a
complex system of tax and resource allocation envisaged under
the Treaty, the Treaty also provided for a standing ministerial
conference to comprise representatives of the governments of
Australia and Indonesia. 99
Previous Australia-Indonesia
continental shelf agreements, concluded in 1971 and 1972, had
delimited the waters to the east and west of East Timor, but no
agreement had been reached between Australia and Portugal or
Australia and Indonesia defining rights over the waters and shelf

96.
For a report on the international consensus that the presence of
Indonesia in East Timor is illegal, see In East Timor, A Quiet Rite, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 18, 1996, at 4. Further suggesting continued international interest in
the issue, a number of states reportedly recognized East Timor as an independent
state in 1975 and have given no indication that they "retract" their recognition.
The recognizing states were Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao
Tome and Principe, Albania, Benin, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China,
Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea (Conakry), North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Tanzania.
See Clark, supranote 89, at 71 n.29.
97.

AUSTRALIAN DEPI

"

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 30

(1979), quoted in Christine M. Chinkin, East Timor Moves to the World Court 4
EUR. J. INTLL. 206, 207 n.5 (1993).
See Chinkin, supra note 97, at 207; Clark, supra note 64, at 89 n.80
98.
(citing statement by Sen. Gareth Evans, Austl. Hansard, Senate, Oct. 18, 1988).
99.
See Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec. 11", 1989, 29
I.L.M. 469 (1990). For a detailed discussion of the terms of the delineation of
Australian and Indonesian zones under the Treaty, see William T. Onorato & Mark
J. Valencia, InternationalCooperationfor Petroleum Development: The Timor Gap
Treaty, 5 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1 (1990).
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between East Timor and Australia. The sea and its underlying
strata between the opposing Australian and East Timorese coasts,
an area that had become known as the Timor Gap, thus was not
subject to any delimitation. The 1989 treaty, however, delimited
it. Portugal viewed the 1989 treaty as a form of recognition of
Indonesia's claim to East Timor. As such, Portugal further viewed
the treaty as a delict by Australia against Portugal. Portugal filed
application on February 22, 1991 to institute proceedings against
Australia before the ICJ.1° 0
B. The East Timor Case

1. The Majority Opinion
The Court held fourteen to two in favor of Australia. The
majority opinion focused on whether, in reaching the merits of
the dispute, the ICJ would have to rule on rights and obligations
of a third state not party to the proceedings. 10 1 This approach
had been anticipated by writers studying the case before the
Court issued its disposition.1 0 2 Australia argued from the basic
principle set forth in Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943
that third-party consent is required for the ICJ to exercise
jurisdiction over a matter that will decide the rights and
obligations of the third party.10 3 Indonesian conduct was the
true target of Portugal's suit, according to Austraia.1° 4
It

100.
For initial motions in the case, see Case ConcerningEast Timor (Port. v.
AustI.), 1993 I.C.J. 32 (May 19); Case ConcerningEast Timor (Port. v. AustI.), 1992
I.C.J. 228 (June 19); Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. AustI.), 1991 I.C.J. 9
(May 3).
101.
Case Concerning East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 90.
102.
See, e.g., Chinkin, supra note 97, at 218-22 (examining in detail
precedent on the Australian theory); Clark, supra note 64, at 75 n. 19
(Presumably, in spite of [Portugal's] effort to draft the pleadings in such a way as
to emphasize Australia's breaches of international law rather than those of
Indonesia, Australia will argue some variations on the theme that Indonesia is an
indispensable party in the proceedings which should therefore not proceed.');
Simpson, supra note 5, at 344 (calling indispensable third parties a 'notoriously
complex question"). Simpson cites lain Scobbie as another writer predicting
possible jurisdictional problems in connection with the indispensable third-party.
See lain Scobbie, The Presence of an Absent Third: Procedural Aspects of the East
Timor Case (Nov. 1992) (paper delivered at the Catholic Inst. for Intl Relations and
the Intl Platform of Jurists for East Timor Conference), noted in Simpson, supra
note 5, at 344 n.93.
103.
See Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v.
Fr., U.K. & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32 (June 15); Case Concerning East Timor, 1995
I.C.J. at 100.
104.
See Case Concerning East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 100-01 (stating that
Australia contends it is being sued in place of Indonesia); Chinkin, supranote 97,
at 219.
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followed, then, that any holding on the merits would determine
rights and obligations of Indonesia. The Court indicated that the
central question for review was the locus of the power to conclude
a continental shelf treaty concerning the Timor Gap: did that
power lie with Portugal or with Indonesia?10 5 Judgment, then,
could not avoid deciding the rights and obligations of the nonconsenting third party.
Portugal attempted to rebut this argument, which Australia
had presented initially and which the Court, in basic form,
adopted. 10
The Court, Portugal argued, did not need to
approach the issue of Indonesian rights de novo because these
rights had already been settled by the General Assembly and the
Security Council "acting within their proper spheres of
competence."1 0 7
Portugal maintained that the ten U.N.
resolutions-two Security Council, eight General Assembly-were
legal articles of which judicial notice could be taken.1 0 8 The
Court disagreed, stating that
[t]he argument of Portugal... rests on the premise that the United
Nations resolutions, and in particular those of the Security Council,
can be read as imposing an obligation on States not to recognize
any authority on the part of Indonesia over the Territory and, where
the latter is concerned, to deal only with Portugal. The Court is not
persuaded, however, that the relevant resolution went so far. 109

The majority opinion went on to note the purport of the U.N.
resolutions in question and acknowledged the status of East
Timor as a non-self-governing territory. 1 10 The Court concluded
that the resolutions were not self-proving documents and thus on
their own did not establish a rule of non-recognition of
Indonesian and recognition of Portuguese rights in East Timor:
The Court finds that it cannot be inferred from the sole fact that the
above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Security Council refer to Portugal as the administering Power of
East Timor that they intended to establish an obligation on third
States to treat exclusively with Portugal as regards the continental
1 11
shelf of East Timor.

The Court noted as evidence that several states had concluded
treaties with Indonesia since the annexation of East Timor, and

105. See Case ConcerningEast 7Tmor, 1995 I.C.J. at 101-02.
106. The attempt by Portugal to defeat the indispensable third-party
argument seemed to have precedent in its favor; the ICJ had rejected arguments
similar to the Australian argument in all but one instance in which parties had
presented them. See Chinkin, supra note 97, at 218-20.
107.
Case ConcerningEast 7mor, 1995 I.C.J. at 103.
108. See id. at 103-04.
109. Id.at 103.
110. See id.
111. Id.at 104.
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these contained no reservations regarding the disputed
territory.1 1 2 The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
1 3
matter.'
The dispute required the Court to reach Indonesian
interests-those interests not having been conclusively decided by
the U.N. resolutions-and this the Court could not do absent
Indonesian consent to ICJ jurisdiction. 11 4 There was, according
to the Court, no international rule of recognition or nonrecognition regarding the status of East Timor, and, if the ratio

112.
See id.
113.
See id. at 105.
114.
See id.at 104-05. Considering that the core operative fact in East Timor
was an alleged delict by Indonesia, it is noteworthy that Portugal did not bring
suit against Indonesia. Portugal may well have decided that Indonesia was very
unlikely to consent to jurisdiction (Indonesia was not one of the states recognizing
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICU by means of declaration under Article 36(2) of
the ICJ Statue). See id. By contrast, Australia was probably assumed to be
amenable because Australia recognized compulsory jurisdiction. See Chinkin,
supra note 97, at 219. Moreover, Australia had demonstrated its amenability to
ICJ process in Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13). In addition to Australia's greater willingness to
participate in an ICJ action, Portugal may have had another reason for
considering it a more advantageous target: the nature of Australia's political
system. If Portugal were unable to persuade the Court of the existence of a
general international norm obliging collective non-recognition of statuses achieved
by illegal use of force or a specific U.N. rule requiring non-recognition of the
annexation of East Timor, it is possible that Australia and its opinion-forming
polity would nonetheless be sensitive to the mere charge of a violation. Public
disapprobation has a more powerful effect on the power processes of a liberal
democratic state than an authoritarian state. Accordingly, challenging Australia
before the ICJ might have triggered political reactions beneficial to Portugal's
cause. Though a favorable internal dynamic might not have been entirely lacking
in Indonesia, the role of civil society in shaping international legal policy in
Indonesia is probably less pronounced than in Australia. An ICJ action against
Indonesia, even in the unlikely event Indonesia had consented, would have
eventuated little internal pressure to change policy toward East Timor. An ICJ
action against Australia, even in the event of dismissal before a hearing on the
merits, probably furthered Portugal's cause in the political processes of the
respondent. The active role that Australia has played in international intervention
in East Timor since September 1999 suggests that sympathies among the policyinfluencing public in Australia indeed are aligned with the East Timorese and that
the public may have been sensitive to pressure in the form of ICJ proceedings.
Australia committed some 4500 troops to the multinational force for East Timor
(INTERFET) authorized in S.C. Res. 1264 of Sept. 15, 1999, see supra note 2, to
restore order and protect UNAMET (the U.N. organization overseeing the popular
consultation of Aug. 30, 1999 and authorized by S.C. Res. 1246 of June 11, 1999,
see S.C. Res. 1246, 4013th mtg. para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (1999)).
Australia further has pledged similar forces to the police and military component
of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET
authorized under S.C. Res. 1272 of Oct. 25, 1999. See S.C. Res. 1272, 4057th
mtg. para 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999). For some thoughts on whether an
impleaded but non-appearing state can be a "party" to ICJ proceedings, see HUGH
W.A. THIRLWAY, NON-APPEARANcE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JuSTIcE 4663 (1985).
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were given general application, U.N. resolutions-at least
resolutions not more explicit on the subject of recognition than
those regarding East Timor--could not give rise to such a rule
1 15
over any territory.
Three separate opinions concurred with the judgment of the
Court, and two judges dissented.
The separate concurring
opinions of Judges Oda, Shahabuddeen, and Vereshchetin will be
examined, followed by an analysis of the dissents.
2. Concurrence
Judge Shahabuddeen agreed with the majority on the
character of U.N. practice in the matter of non-recognition. The
U.N. resolutions on East Timor, Shahabuddeen wrote, do not by
themselves have the meaning Portugal attributed to them. To
treat them as a binding rule of non-recognition, the Court would
1 16
have had to have interpreted them as such.
Judge Vereshchetin identified another aspect of the
Portuguese case as flawed: its failure to take into account the
rights of the East Timorese. To Judge Vereshchetin, this was
fatal to jurisdiction. 117 The people of East Timor, he wrote, were
the party most effected by the root question on review, and thus
the Court could not have jurisdiction in their absence from the
proceedings. 1 18 Judge Vereshchetin's separate opinion neither
necessarily confirmed nor rejected Portugal's argument that U.N.
resolutions generated a general obligation not to recognize the
alleged incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia.
Judge Oda, in the most interesting of the three separate
opinions, seems to have accepted that a general rule of nonrecognition was established by U.N. practice. East Timor, Judge
Oda wrote, was taken in an illegal use of force, and the United
Nations acted within its competence when it condemned this. 1 19
In joining the Court in its holding of lack of jurisdiction, Judge
Oda did not, then, concur with the proposition that a rule of nonrecognition could be given effect only after a judicial decision as
to the rights and obligations of non-party Indonesia. Judge Oda
rejected jurisdiction because he rejected Portuguese standing.' 20
To Judge Oda, the important factor was that the U.N. resolutions

115. See Case ConcerningEast Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 104.
116. See id. at 123 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
117. See id. at 135 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 116 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
120. See id.at 118. Chinkin also had speculated, before the ICJ issued its
decision, that a standing defect in connection with Portugal might have barred
adjudication of the merits. See Chinldn, supra note 97, at 210-17.
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were negative of Indonesian claims of right over East Timor, not
affirmative of Portuguese claims:
Indonesia's claim that East Timor should be integrated into its
territory was rejected solely in order to uphold the rights of the
people of East Timor but not to protect the rights and duties of the
State of Portugal in relation to East Timor or the status of Portugal
as the administering Power.121

One senses in Judge Oda's Separate Opinion an apprehension of
perverse consequences were Portugal granted standing. Portugal
had marked itself for over a decade as one of Europe's most
unreconstructed colonial powers.
It administered overseas
territories in defiance of U.N. resolutions and administered them
badly.
Moreover, on the eve of Timorese independence, it
evacuated the territory in a "cut-and-run" fashion almost befitting
comic opera. To have construed from U.N. practice any right of
Portugal to East Timor would have run against U.N. purposes, as
expressed in over forty years of practice regarding non-selfgoverning territories.
3. Dissents
The dissenting opinions, filed by Judges Weeramantry and
Skubiszewski, both proposed that recognition of the territorial
changes effectuated since 1975 by Indonesia on the island of
Timor is a delict. But the two opinions differed in their reasoning.
Judge Weeramantry posited that an international rule regarding
recognition and non-recognition of Portuguese and Indonesian
claims over East Timor could have been deduced from U.N.
practice regarding East Timor since 1975.122 In this, Judge
Weeramantry concluded that the law has moved toward requiring
that collective process govern recognition, and that once a rule of
non-recognition is established by the political organs of the U.N.
regarding a particular situation, the rule is binding erga
omnes. 123 Skubiszewski, by contrast, took the view that the duty
of non-recognition flowed, not from a collective decision as to the
status of East Timor specifically, but from a general international
rule of non-recognition of changes effectuated by threat or use of
force. 12 4 While Judge Weeramantry took the view that a specific
rule of non-recognition had been legislated as regarded the

121.
See Case Concerning East Tinwr, 1995 I.C.J. at 116 (Oda, J., separate
opinion). Judge Oda, like Judge Shahabuddeen, expressed concern about the
indigenous people.
122.
Id. at 202 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
123.
See id. at 172.
124.
See id. at 262-63 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
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putative incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, 12 5 Judge
Skubiszewski held that a general rule exists applying to all such
126
situations.
Judge Weeramantry wrote that the ICJ erred when it
proposed to take on work properly performed already by the
United Nations-that is, the work of deciding a collective
international response to the purported incorporation of East
Timor into Indonesia. "The Court cannot be reduced to inaction,"
Judge Weeramantry wrote, "by throwing upon it a burden duly
discharged by the appropriate United Nations organs, acting
within their proper authority."1 2 7 No interpretative judicial lens
was necessary, as the U.N. resolutions were already international
law:
[The] resolutions of the General Assembly which expressly reject
the claim that East Timor has been integrated into Indonesia...
declare that the people of East Timor must be enabled to determine
their own future within the framework of the United Nations and
expressly recognize Portugal as the administering Power are
resolutions which are productive of legal effects. 128

The resolutions, in Judge Weeramantry's view, are a form of
collective recognition, and the ICJ could have taken notice of this
without further analysis. 129 Australia, the dissenting opinion
continued, extended de jure recognition to the annexation of East
Timor, in possible violation of East Timorese sovereignty and East
Timorese self-determination.1 3 0
Judge Weeramantry proposes
the United Nations as an organ of collective recognition and, by
extension, proposes that the ICJ enforce decisions made in that
capacity. 131
Judge Skubiszewski expressed more concern over East
Timorese rights, yet in the course of his dissenting opinion, he left
less certain than Judge Weeramantry the role of the United
Nations as an organ of collective recognition and of the ICJ as
enforcer thereof. Judge Skubiszewski noted as progenitors of a
modem rule of non-recognition Hersch Lauterpacht and, with the
eponymous doctrine on Manchukuo, Henry Stimson.13 2 The rule,
he declared, "now constitutes part of general international law"
and is even on its way to becoming jus cogens.1 3 3 Territorial

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id.(Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
See id.(Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 155 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
Id. at 186 (citations omitted).
See id.
See i. at 204.
See id.
See id.at 262-63 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
Id.
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change enacted by force is not to be recognized, and this, Judge
Skubiszewski posited, is a "self-executory" rule:
[T]he rule of non-recognition operates in a self-executory way. To
be operative it does not need to be repeated by the United Nations
or other international organizations. Consequently, the absence of
such direction on the part of the international organization in a
particular instance does not relieve any State from the duty of nonrecognition. Nor does the absence of "collective sanctions" have
that effect. 134

Judge Skubiszewski's dissenting opinion implied that the
institutional framework of the U.N. system is not needed on a
case-by-case basis in establishing rules of non-recognition
binding on all. The prohibition against the threat or use of force
gives rise automatically to a rule of non-recognition regarding any
situation violating the prohibition. The rule of non-recognition is
freestanding and requires no institutional action beyond,
perhaps, a finding of fact that an illegal use or threat of force has
taken place; however, it is unclear whether Judge Skubiszewski
takes the view that even this finding need be reached through a
collective institutional process. Judge Skubiszewski indicated
that U.N. resolutions calling for non-recognition may amplify the
responsibility of states to withhold recognition of the annexation
of East Timor, 13 s but he expressly declared that these are not
necessary for that responsibility to attach.1 3 6 Indeed, terming
recognition "still a 'free act,' Judge Skubiszewski reaffirmed the
discretionary nature of recognition.
The Judge went on to
propose, as if tempering his assessment that recognition remains
a matter for the individual state to decide, that "the discretionary
nature of the act has been changed by the rule on the prohibition
of the threat or use of force." 13 7 Precisely how the enduring
freedom of states on matters of recognition has been effected by
the change in "the discretionary nature of the act" Judge
Skubiszewski did not explain.
4. Analyzing the Opinions
The separate writings in East Timor may be distinguished by
how much institutional process each argues is necessary to make
non-recognition mandatory. The majority opinion requires not
only an initiative from the political organs of the United Nations,

134.
Id. at 264.
135.
See id. at 262-63 (noting U.N. resolutions on the status of East Timor,
in addition to a general rule requiring non-recognition of changes achieved by
force).
136.
See supranote 134 and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 264.
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but also ICJ interpretation. 138 Judge Weeramantry views U.N.
resolutions as sufficient. According to Judge Skubiszewski,
general international law on its own indicates when nonrecognition is mandatory, and he would require accordingly no
formal or collective announcement of non-recognition in specific
cases of changes of territorial control by force.
This division of opinion had been prefigured in the writing of
publicists before the ICJ issued its disposition in East Tmor.
Christine Chinkin (Professor of Law, University of Southampton)
doubted whether the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions on East Timor had established a rule of nonrecognition. Professor Chinkin stated that "the United Nations
has not passed .

.

. resolutions .

.

. that there is a positive duty

not to recognize Indonesia's presence in East Timor"' 3 9 and that
"the Security Council has not specifically called for nonrecognition of the Indonesian annexation of East Timor." 14
Professor Chinkin's restrictive view on the language requisite to
establish a rule of non-recognition, however, is itself open to
doubt. In comparison with the language used in the resolutions
concerning Kuwait, the South African "Homelands," 14 ' and
Rhodesia, 142 the language used in the East Timor resolutions
indeed was unspecific regarding obligations of non-recognition.
Meanwhile, the language in the resolutions concerning
Katanga 143 was arguably less specific than the language in the
East Timor resolutions, yet has been interpreted as having
required non-recognition. 144
Professor Maria Clara Maffei
(University of Parma), prefiguring Judge Weeramantry, suggested
that there in fact did exist as concerned East Timor a rule of nonrecognition legislated at the U.N. level. In particular, Maffei
adduced as supplementary evidence, reinforcing the U.N.
resolutions, the fact that the United Nations declined to send
observers to East Timor following invitations by Indonesia to do
so. 14 5

"The absence of United Nations observers," Maffei wrote,

"can be interpreted as a sign of the will not to recognize the
138. Because of the third-party problem, no judicial interpretation was
possible one way or the other in the case at bar.
139.

Chinkin, supra note 97, at 213.

140. Id. at 215.
141. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3411 D, supra note 47; S.C. Res. 402, supra note
47; G.A. Res. 2775 E, supranote 47; supratext accompanying note 47.
142. See G.A. Res. 2022, supra note 33 and accompanying text; S.C. Res.
216, supra note 34 and accompanying text; S.C. Res. 217, supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
143.
See S.C. Res. 145, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 169, supra note 28; G.A.
Res. 1474, supra note 26; supratext accompanying note 26.
144.
See DUGARD, supranote 13, at 86-90.
145. See Maria Clara Maffei, The Case of East Timor Before the International
Court of Justice-Some Tentative Comments, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 223, 227 (1993).
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presence of Indonesia in East Timor and not to legitimize the
process of decolonization and the exercise of the right to self14 6
determination outside the machinery of the United Nations."
Professor Roger S. Clark (Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers
University) approximated the view of Judge Skubiszewski by
developing the argument that a general rule of non-recognition of
territorial acquisitions done by force exists and, thus, that
Australian conduct was illegal. According to Professor Clark, the
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Relations
Declaration)' 47 and the 1974 Definition of Aggression (Definition
of Aggression Resolution),' 148 especially when viewed in light of
active Australian participation in the drafting and approval of the
resolutions, established a rule, binding at least on Australia, not
to recognize changes in the disposition of territory effectuated by
force. 14 9 The Friendly Relations Declaration stated, "The territory
of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State
resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition
resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as
legal." 15 0 The Definition of Aggression Resolution stated, "No
territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from
aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful."' 1 ' Clark further
adduced as support for a general rule of non-recognition the
duration and breadth of practice consonant with it. League of
Nations practice already contained something like it, and regional
multilateral treaties in Latin America did as well.' 5 2 Under the
view put forth by Professor Clark and Judge Skubiszewski,
specific announcements of a rule of non-recognition, such as
were issued in connection with Rhodesia, the "Homelands," and
Namibia, could be dispensed with since a general obligation now
existed under international law to withhold recognition from
changes in the disposition of territory effectuated by force.
Notably, the ICJ rejected an Australian argument that there
was in East Timor no justiciable issue presented for review.
Australia had argued that it was being sued as a proxy for

146. Id.
147. See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971).
148.
See G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975).
149.
See Clark, supranote 64, at 76-92.
150. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 147, annex. para. 1.
151. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 148, annex art. 5 para. 3. The theory,
shared by Clark and Judge Skubiszewski, was also sketched out by Simpson,
supranote 5, at 345-46.
152.
See Clark, supranote 64, at 86-87.
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Indonesia for Indonesian actions. Thus, the parties at bar were
not parties in altercation.' 5 3 The Court, however, stated that a
dispute did exist. The questions presented were (1) 'whether
Australia had failed to recognize Portugal as the administering
Power for East Timor, East Timor as a non-self-governing
territory, and the right of the East Timorese to self-determination;
15 4
and (2), in so doing, whether Australia had committed a delict.
In dismissing Australia's argument that Portugal had
presented no dispute, the ICJ left open the possibility that states
could bring actions in the future for delictual recognition. If the
Court had ruled that no dispute was presented in Portugal's
pleadings, then the only action open to a party alleging injury
from illegal changes in territorial status would be an action
against the malfeasant which executed the changes. This would
remove any chance of sanction against the third state, such as
Australia, contemplating recognition, express or implied, of the
illegal situation. Under the majority opinion in East Timor, the
ICJ could entertain in principle a suit against a third state
accused of breaking a collective rule of non-recognition. The
problem in East Timor was that there was, in the view of the
Court, no such rule freestanding, and the posture of the parties
did not permit the finding of such a rule from extant practice of
U.N. political organs. According to the ICJ, non-recognition
opposable against third states in judicial proceedings cannot
emanate from the U.N. political organs alone. The Court only
acknowledged U.N. resolutions on East Timor as evidence of a
rule of non-recognition. To treat those resolutions themselves as
a rule of non-recognition regarding incorporation of East Timor
into Indonesia, the Court apprehended that it would have had to
consider the resolutions, if not on their merits de novo, then at
least with an eye to determining their international legal status.
The Court did not view the resolutions as final as regarded
Indonesian rights. Judicial examination of the resolutions, then,
was the stumbling block. According to the Court, an examination
of the resolutions was necessary if any rule of non-recognition
were to be established, but any conclusions from such
examination would have decided Indonesian rights. Without
Indonesian consent to ICJ jurisdiction, no matter requiring
decision as to Indonesian rights could be entertained. It was the
absence of a pre-existing rule of non-recognition-not the lack of
a justiciable dispute-that barred the Court from holding on the
merits. If, however, a rule of non-recognition had already existed,

153. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 10001 (June 30); Chinldn, supranote 97, at 218.
154. See Case ConcerningEast Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 100-01.
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then the case could have gone to the merits. The reservation
implicit in the majority reasoning is that third states could be
taken to task for acts of recognition done in the face of collective
non-recognition.
This is an important reservation. Recognition might well be
strengthened as a methodology of response to uncertain claims if
its extension in violation of the law opens the door to negative
sanction. In the case at bar, as the Court saw it, collective nonrecognition simply was not a settled issue nor could it have been
settled without deciding non-party rights. If, however, the view
espoused by Judge Weeramantry had been adopted by the Court,
then Indonesia's legal rights would already have been decided by
the political organs of the United Nations. Accordingly, Portugal's
claim against Australia could have been heard on the merits, and
the ICJ would have had to determine whether Australia had
committed an illegal act of recognition.
The aperture that the Court seems to have left open-for
adjudication of a claim of illegal recognition-may well furnish in
the future a mechanism for regulating controversial claims
concerning territory and statehood. The telling case would be one
in which a rule of non-recognition has been set forth in
unambiguous terms by the political organs of the United Nations,
thus giving the party instituting proceedings a clearer basis for
action than was available to Portugal and possibly clearing the air
of the problem of the unimpleaded third party.

